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Summary
The River Ouse forms a significant part of Humber river system, which drains about
one fifth the land area of England and provides the largest fresh water source to the
North Sea from UK. The river quality in the tidal river suffered from sag of dissolved
oxygen (DO) during last few decades, deteriorated by the effluent discharges. The
Environment Agency (EA) proposed to increase the water quality of Ouse by
implementing more potent environmental policies. This paper explores the cost
effectiveness of water management in the Tidal Ouse through various options by taking
into account the variation of assimilative capacity of river water, both in static and
dynamic scope of time. Reduction in both effluent discharges and water abstraction
were considered along side with choice of effluent discharge location. Different
instruments of environmental policy, the emission tax-subsidy (ETS) scheme and
tradable pollution permits (TPP) systems were compared with the direct quantitative
control approach. This paper at the last illustrated an empirical example to reach a
particular water quality target in the tidal Ouse at the least cost, through a solution of
constrained optimisation problem. The results suggested significant improvement in the
water quality with less cost than current that will fail the target in low flow year.
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Abstract
The River Ouse forms a significant part of Humber river system, which drains about
one fifth land area of the England and provides the largest fresh water source to the
North Sea from UK. The river quality in the tidal river suffered from sag of dissolved
oxygen (DO) during last few decades, deteriorated by the effluent discharges. The
Environment Agency (EA) proposed to increase the water quality of Ouse by
implementing more potent environmental policies. This paper explores the cost
effectiveness of water management in the Tidal Ouse through various options by taking
into account the variation of assimilative capacity of river water, both in static and
dynamic scope of time. Reduction in both effluent discharges and water abstraction were
considered along side with choice of effluent discharge location. Different instruments of
environmental policy, the emission tax-subsidy (ETS) scheme and tradable pollution
permits (TPP) systems were compared with the direct quantitative control approach.
This paper at the last illustrated an empirical example to reach a particular water
quality target in the tidal Ouse at the least cost, through a solution of constrained
optimisation problem. The results suggested significant improvement in the water quality
with less cost than current that will fail the target in low flow year.
Key words: water quality management, tradable pollution permits, tax and subsidy,
effluent discharge, water abstraction, dynamic equilibrium, integrated river policy, cost
effectiveness
JEL: C31, C61, L51, R19

1. Introduction
1.1 Problem in the tidal Ouse
The river Ouse forms part of the Humber river system, which drains about one fifth
of the land area of England. The Humber estuary, which is the largest fresh water source
to the North Sea from UK, together with its tributaries and other eastern rivers contain a
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richer fish fauna than any other rivers in England. A big proportion of the Humber
catchment is densely populated and industrialised, most of which is drained by Yorkshire
Ouse and Trent systems. The confluences of the main tributaries of Ouse are
downstream of its tidal limit, with only a quarter of the flow from the non-tidal
catchment (Edwards et al. 1997). The Humber river system is shown in Figure 1 as
below. This paper focuses on the water quality in the tidal Ouse along with its tributaries
Wharfe, Derwent, Aire and Don.
Salmon were common in the Ouse up to the nineteenth century. However,
development of industries along the various tributaries in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries led to an enormous increase in effluent discharged to the river. This
together with some other factors led to the reduction of salmon in the Ouse. As a result,
the EA chose salmon as a key indicator of the river’s ecological health, and proposed to
improve water quality by implementing more effective environmental policies (Cashman
et al. 1999). This Paper aims to evaluate the cost effectiveness of water management and
pollution control in the tidal Ouse through different options, taking into account both
effluent discharges and water abstraction.

1.2 Water quality management in the Tidal Ouse
Although the river quality has been improved significantly in Ouse system in the last
ten years, it still suffers from the DO sag in the summer months, especially downstream
of Selby industrial effluent discharges. As a result DO levels in some parts of the river
and at some times of the year are too low to support fish. The worst DO sag locates
around Selby and Long Drax during the summer months, preventing the returned salmon.
The decline of salmon stock in the Ouse system is due to a number of factors, which
includes over-fishing around Greenland, commercial netting in estuaries, habitat loss,
increased sediment load and river morphology changes. But effluent discharges from the
industries were regarded as the primary cause of DO sag. Rainfall also varies
dramatically over space and time in the catchment region, with highest rainfall over
1600 mm p.a. in parts of Pennines and in the winter due to the prevailing wind (Law et
al. 1997), and much less rainfall in Southeast catchment and dry summer. The inland
penetration of tides during low flows transports sediment upstream, while resuspension
of sediments results in considerable DO consumption. In addition, large quantities of
river water are abstracted and transferred through its grid by Yorkshire Water to supply
portable water for over 3.5 million people, and returned to the river system through
sewage treatment works. One obvious effect on the water quality in the tidal Ouse is the
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reduction of clean freshwater flows from northern rivers and rising volume of poor
quality water returned from the industrial south tributaries (Edwards et al. 1997)

The EA intends to improve river water quality by tightening discharge consents in
Selby. A new system of pollution control is being implemented in order to restore water
quality in the Ouse, which is driven by the EU Directive on Integrated Pollution
Prevention and Control (IPPC). The essence of IPPC is that operators should choose the
best option available to achieve an agreed level of protection of the environment taken
as a whole. The Best Available Techniques (BAT) approach is typically modified by the
declaration that the cost of applying techniques should not be excessive in relation to the
environmental protection it provides. However, the IPPC Scheme requires BAT to be
applied in the abatement of pollution while no clear definition of BAT is provided. A
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more rigorous way of addressing the issue of cost is to identify the most cost effective
method for achieving a given targeted reduction on emissions.
Water abstraction has impacts on river water quality as well as effluent discharges.
Since river volume affects the assimilative capacity, it is apparent that water abstraction
has adverse impacts on river water quality, and the effects are interdependent of the
effects of effluent discharged into the river body. Therefore, it is necessary to include
both industrial effluent and water abstraction in an integrated regulation system. To date,
however, effluent discharge consents and water abstraction licenses have not taken into
account variation in the assimilative capacity of river, or the interdependence of effluent
and water abstraction.
The current regulatory system controlling effluent discharge and water abstraction in
Tidal Ouse and Humber estuaries is characterized by two different policies both
implemented by the EA: discharge consents for effluents and a system of tradable Water
Abstraction Licenses for water abstractions respectively. The consents for effluents take
fixed value over the year, though some allow certain extent of variation and violation
over the year. An abstraction licence generally states how much water may be taken,
from where it may be taken, how it may be used and where it may be returned to river.
Water abstraction licenses recently became time limited and can only be renewed upon
application. However, the amount granted each license is given on the annual basis and
allows the abstractor to take water from river any time of the year, no matter what the
river condition is.
Because of these inefficiencies in the current regulations system, excessive social
costs are carried by both the industries involved and the local economy that they serve.
Most firms that discharge effluents into the tidal Ouse are located in the Selby area. The
extra costs imposed by regulations may have significant impacts on the local economy
and residents. This paper explored the potential cost advantages of rive policy based on
the variation of assimilative capacity or river water. Using a water quality model
developed for the EA to set the effluent consents, this research evaluated the potential
options in water quality management that are available for the tidal Ouse following the
variation of assimilative capacity. This paper also derived a simplified system of water
quality functions through regression for the tidal Ouse, based on the most influencing
factors to the DO saturation (DO%) of river water. This system of water quality function
was then combined with the cost functions derived for various water quality
management options to construct the static optimisation analysis, which revealed a cost
minimisation solution for a given water quality compliance required by the EA. The cost
minimisation solution was able to significantly improve the water quality and remove
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the DO sag even for one of the years with the least river flow and the worst ambient
water quality, while still having a cost saving of £200,000 per year to the current annual
costs of water management in the tidal Ouse. This integrated river policy considered in
this optimisation does not just imply integration on effluent discharges and water
abstractions, but also the physical effect on water quality and the social cost of water
management, which is consistent to the requirement of the most recent European
regulation of Water Framework Directive (WFD).

1.4 The structure of the paper
The paper consists of six sections. The second section discussed two previous
researches for the pollution control in the estuarine systems in UK that initiate the
evaluation of cost for water quality improvement. These were compared with this
research as well.
A third section offers a static analysis of environment policy to control pollution
along the river when the spatial location of effluent sources and water abstraction were
referred in the river regulation. This paper discussed the necessary condition to achieve
the least cost for a particular water quality target under a static system and the
underlined economic interpretation.
The fourth section offered dynamic analysis for the same issue, when the relevant
activities to control water quality were driven by the investment and capital stock within
the sector. The cost minimisation under the dynamic system led to an unstable
equilibrium of saddle point, in which the steady state can only be reached through
specific investment path. I also discussed differences between the equilibria of the ETS
scheme and the TPP system, which are usually the same under static analysis.
Comparative statics indicate the direction of change in the dynamic system caused by
the policy instruments, when alteration is necessary to achieve the prescribed
environmental target.
Section five illustrated an empirical example of water quality improvement in the
tidal Ouse, through an integrated measure consistent to the variation of assimilative
capacity of river water, to achieve the given water quality target at the least costs. The
section discussed the methods and solution of the constrained optimisation problem,
showing that the water quality could be dramatically improved following the solution
generated with more than £200,000 cost saving over the current cost of water quality
management which cannot prevent the DO sag in low flow conditions.

2. Pollution Control in Estuarine System

-5-
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Although most economists agree that Market Based Instruments (MBIs) are more
efficient both in cost saving and dynamic incentives over Command and Control (CAC)
approaches (Oates and Strassmann 1984; Baumol and Oates 1988; Perman et al. 1996;
Hanley et al. 1997; Cowan 1998), uncertainty over both pollution-related environmental
damage and costs and benefits estimates, the significance of hazardous environmental
risks, and significance of fixed costs could reduce their advantages over the direct
regulatory standards (Turner et al. 1994; Zylicz 2003). Since estuarine system involves
considerable uncertainty, it is a moot point to say MBIs are necessarily more appropriate.
Two papers have discussed the implications of market-based instruments for UK
estuaries.
(a) The Tees Estuary Study (Rowley 1979)
In 1979, the Tees Estuary was so “grossly polluted” that it was not able to support
fisheries from Stockton to the mouth of the estuary. Research by Rowley et al.
investigated the possibility of utilizing an emission charge rather than regulatory
consents to control pollution in the estuary and to achieve satisfactory water quality.
Nine major industrial pollution sources were included in an economic model in which a
least-cost solution was found, using transfer coefficients from a water quality model.
Appropriate charge rates were identified for particular water quality targets. The study
found that the cost of reaching the desired water quality objective would be much lower
using emission charge instruments than regulatory consents. It also found that control
costs were sensitive to the time period within which the target was required to be met.
Hence emission charge rates were different in different stretches. However, information
asymmetry between the regulator and industrial sources, and the stepwise nature of the
marginal cost function complicated implementation. The monitoring and enforcement of
the emission charge was also projected to be expensive to administer. Overall, the study
questioned the feasibility of the emission charge instrument.
(b) The Forth Estuary in Scotland (Hanley and Moffatt 1993; Hanley et al. 1998)
The Forth Estuary located in central Scotland is a multi-use resource, providing
water supply for industrial use, recreation, habitat and effluent disposal from industrial
and sewage works. The most significant problem was seasonal DO sag as in the Ouse,
associated with low flow and high temperature conditions. As a result some stretches of
the river fail to comply with Environmental Quality Standards (EQS). The most
significant economic effect was thought to be the effects on the salmon fisheries because
the low DO% prevents the return migration of salmon. The direct cause of the DO sag is
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the effluent emission from the sewage works and industrial processes, among which
industrial sources accounted for 87% of total BOD loading.
An economic model was developed to minimize the control costs subject to the
environmental constraints, alongside a model of water quality. The author explored the
possibility of using a potential tradable permits system to improve the water quality at a
lower cost than uniform restriction on each pollution source. Control costs in each plant
were evaluated for several BOD load reduction scenarios. The corresponding marginal
cost (MC) of control was found to be sensitive to the timescale allowed for the reduction.
The potential cost saving was calculated, and compared with the costs of uniform
constraints.
In the 1993 paper, Hanley and Moffatt conducted a simulation within which the least
cost solution was compared to Tradable Emission Permit (TEP), emission charges and
flexible regulations. A novel result showed that the flexible regulation was closest to the
least cost solution although it could not provide a continuing incentive to reduce
emissions in the most efficient manner. In the 1998 paper, Hanley conducted the analysis
under both an Emission Permits System (EPS) and an Ambient Permits System (APS).
In EPS, emission permits are traded on a one-to-one base along the whole length of the
Estuary. The cost of achieving the target under EPS was increasing at the margin, and
large cost savings were proved over the uniform emissions control. In APS the permits
are traded on the basis of their transfer coefficients and the target is an improvement in
the mean DO% in the estuary rather than a cut in BOD loading. The author found a large
influence from resuspended bottom sediment on the DO distribution along of the estuary,
both from current and past anthropogenic activities.
In both studies, the effect of policy instruments on the pollution control were
subjected to static analysis, and only focused on the effluent emissions to the river. This
paper integrated water abstraction and effluent discharges, as these are interdependent to
their impact on water quality. In addition, the research discussed above did not consider
the dynamic problem, but assumed that plants maintained outputs, and the same level of
emissions. Both static and dynamic analysis were provided the in this research on the
river policy and its cost effectiveness, though the empirical example of tidal Ouse was
evaluated against the static analysis alone due to the constraint of data.

3. Static Analysis of Environmental Policy
The water policies currently implemented in England and Wales dealing with
effluent discharge consents and water abstractions are effluent discharge consents and
tradable water abstraction licenses. Currently, neither instrument takes account the river
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flow. Since river flow has an impact on assimilative capacity and consequently on river
water quality, it is necessary to consider the effect of time-varying and location-specific
consents and licenses to cope with variations in river conditions.

3.1 A General model of cost efficiency of pollution abatement
I assumed a particular pollution externality produced by several firms in a market.
The firms are competitive with each other, and produce a homogenous output qi , and
during production generate emissions ei to the whole market. With an exogenously
determined output price and some inputs invested in pollution abatement, the firm’s
profit may be defined as follows:

B(q i , α i ) = pq i − C i (qi , α i ) − Τ(ei )

…(3.1)

ei = si (qi , α i )

…(3.2)

qi is product output from site i , facing an exogenous price p ; α i denotes the level of
abatement activity and Τ(ei ) reflects private emission-related costs at site i , which can
be attributed to the existence of environmental policy (Xepapadeas 1997).
Although regulation of effluent discharges regulated the pollution discharged into
the receiving water body, only ambient water quality matters. For the tidal Ouse estuary,
there are five Water Quality Monitoring (WQM) sites downstream from Naburn Weir to
Blacktoft before its confluence with Tidal Trent at Trent Fall. Water quality in the tidal
Ouse is influenced by several factors including the tributaries water qualities, industrial
emissions, and water abstractions by water companies as well as volume, velocity and
micro plankton activity of the river.
Water quality at site s is assumed to take the form Qs = f s ( As , E s , H s , ε s ) + γ s
and the ambient water quality target at site s is Qs . It follows that the water quality at
WQP s must satisfy Qs ≥ Qs , ∀s , where

As is background water quality including the inputs from other tributaries at WQP site s,
E s is aggregate industrial effluent discharge at WQP site s,
H s is aggregate water abstraction at WQP site s,

ε s is a vector of other environmental factors that will influence the water quality,
including velocity, volume, river flow and tide etc, and
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γ s is variations not captured by this function.
When locations of effluent discharge and water abstraction matter, a simple sum of
emissions and abstraction from all the sources are not appropriate. Instead, transfer
coefficients of impacts on the water quality at various water quality sites from different
sources are applied to evaluate the aggregate impacts. It is assumed that the sources
linearly contribute to the aggregate emissions or abstractions on the water quality at
WQP site s. Thus
k

k

i =1

i =1

E s = b1s e1 + b2 s e2 + LL + bks ek = ∑ eis = ∑ bis ei ,
k

k

i =1

i =1

H s = d1s β 1 + d 2 s β 2 + LL + d ks β k = ∑ β is = ∑ d is β i ,

…(3.3)

…(3.4)

where bis and d is are the transfer coefficients of impact from the pollution discharge or
water abstraction at site i on the water quality at site s . ei and β i are the effluent
discharge and water abstraction at site i respectively.

3.2 Static Cost effectiveness in ambient water quality control
Let the cost function of each plant at site i , either industrial plant or water company,
take the form of C i (qi , ai , β i ) where qi and ai are the industrial output and abatement
level at site i respectively, and β i is the amount of water abstraction at site i . Assume
that for any combination of qi and ai , the industrial effluent discharge to the river from
site i , ei , can be determined. At this point in time, no firm both discharges effluent to
river and abstracts water at the same time in Selby. Many sources of emissions to the
Ouse currently use ground water for their production process. Nevertheless, I allow for
the case where a firm at site i has ei > 0 and β i > 0 at the same time. For a pure
effluent discharger, β i = 0 and vice versa. Therefore the cost effective allocation of
effluent abatement and water abstraction is the solution to the following problem:
Minimize

∑ C (q , a , β )
i

i

i

i

i

Subject to: Qs = f s ( As , E s , H s , ε s ) + γ s ≥ Qs , for all the s = 1,2 K r .
The Lagrange Equation is:
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L = ∑ C i (qi , ai , β i ) + ∑ λ s ⋅ (Qs − f s ( As , E s , H s , ε s ) − γ s ) . Under the assumption
i

s

of convexity of the cost functions, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions to this optimisation
problem include:

∂C i (⋅)
∂f (⋅) ∂e
− ∑ λ s bis s ⋅ i ≥ 0 ;
∂qi
∂E s ∂qi
s

…(3.5)

 ∂C i (⋅)
∂f (⋅) ∂e 
− ∑ λ s bis s ⋅ i  ⋅ qi = 0, ∀i ;

∂E s ∂qi 
s
 ∂qi

…(3.6)

∂C i (⋅)
∂f (⋅) ∂e
− ∑ λ s bis s ⋅ i ≥ 0 ;
∂ai
∂E s ∂ai
s

…(3.7)

 ∂C i (⋅)
∂f (⋅) ∂e 
− ∑ λ s bis s ⋅ i  ⋅ ai = 0, ∀i ;

∂E s ∂ai 
s
 ∂ai

…(3.8)

∂C i (⋅)
∂f (⋅)
− ∑ λ s d is s ≥ 0 ;
∂β i
∂H s
s

…(3.9)

 ∂C i (⋅)
∂f (⋅) 
− ∑ λ s d is s  ⋅ β i = 0, ∀i ;

∂H s 
s
 ∂β i

…(3.10)

Qs − f s ( As , E s , H s , ε s ) − γ s ≤ 0 ;

…(3.11)

(Q

…(3.12)

s

− f s ( As , E s , H s , ε s ) − γ s ) ⋅ λ s = 0, ∀s ;

qi , ai , β i , λ s ≥ 0, ∀i, ∀s
qi , ai , β i , λ s are all assumed to be positive unless there is plant shut down or any WQP
is of no interest of protection. Therefore it follows:

∂C i (⋅)
∂f (⋅) ∂e
= ∑ λ s bis s ⋅ i∗
∗
∂E s ∂qi
∂qi
s

…(3.13)

∂C i (⋅)
∂f (⋅) ∂e
= ∑ λ s bis s ⋅ i∗
∗
∂E s ∂ai
∂ai
s

…(3.14)

∂C i (⋅)
∂β i

∗

= ∑ λ s d is
s

∂f s (⋅)
∂H s

…(3.15)

f s ( As , E s , H s , ε s ) + γ s = Qs

…(3.16)
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Taking the effects on the catchment as a whole, cost effectiveness implies that

λi = λ j = L = λ s = λ for all the WQP sites if they are all binding, which implies that
∂C i (⋅) ∂q i∗
=
∂f s (⋅) ∂ei
∑s bis ∂E ⋅ ∂q ∗
s
i

∂C i (⋅) ∂ai∗
∂C i (⋅) ∂β i∗
=
=λ
∂f s (⋅) ∂ei
∂f s (⋅)
∑s bis ∂E ⋅ ∂a ∗ ∑s d is ∂H
s
s
i

…(3.17)

Equation (3.17) has clear economic meaning. The cost effective allocation of
effluent abatement and water abstraction in the catchment requires the output, abatement
and abstraction from site i have the same ratio between marginal private cost and
marginal impact on the river water quality at all the WQP sites. To be cost efficient, this
would equal to the marginal social value of ambient water quality improvement at each
site. To be cost effective, the environmental target is met at least cost to society. By
switching the target from cost efficiency to cost effectiveness, the exact value of shadow
price is no longer a constraint for the allocation of emissions and abstraction. Actually,
for whatever the ratio is, cost effectiveness will be achieved as long as the prescribed
environment quality targets are not violated, i.e.

∂C i (⋅) ∂qi∗
=
∂f s (⋅) ∂ei
∑s bis ∂E ⋅ ∂q ∗
s
i

∂C i (⋅) ∂a i∗
∂C i (⋅) ∂β i∗
=
=a.
∂f s (⋅) ∂ei
∂f s (⋅)
∑s bis ∂E ⋅ ∂a ∗ ∑s d is ∂H
s
s
i

where a reflects the preference of choice of the environmental authority.

4. Dynamic Analysis of Environmental Policy
4.1 Dynamic problem with continuous time
In the dynamic system, output, abatement and abstraction are dynamic functions of
the capital stock available to the firm (assuming that the costs of labour are negligible
compared with capital costs, and could be included in the operational costs). The initial
capital stock of firm depends on prior investment, which is exogenous in the model, and
depreciation of the capital stock. The output, abatement and abstraction are assumed as
below to be functions of their capital stocks, which are dynamic against time.

q i (t ) = q i (k iq (t ))
a i (t ) = a i (k ia (t ))

β i (t ) = β i (k iβ (t ))
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2007
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The problem then is to identify the optimal future investment path under different
environmental policy instruments, and to evaluate their feasibility. The time horizon of
the dynamic problem is taken to be infinity. This is not necessarily because that the firm
or environment authority has a prospect of sustainable development for infinite time, but
even if the time horizon of planning were finite, the remaining value still have to be
estimated at the horizon by discounting what they are in the future (Aronsson et al.
2004).
as, Max
F (t )

Therefore,

the

optimisation

problem

may

T

T

∞

∞

t =0

t =0

t =T

t =0

be

written

∑ ρ t ⋅ F (t ) + V (T ) = ∑ ρ t ⋅ F (t ) + ∑ ρ t ⋅ F (t ) = ∑ ρ t ⋅ F (t ) . That is, the

optimisation problem in a finite horizon will end up the same as the problem in an
infinite horizon. In this paper, the firm’s objective is to minimize the aggregate costs of
achieving the desired water quality level. The environment authority is to maintain
water quality at least at the required level during whatever the policy horizon.
The objective is to achieve the environmental target at minimum cost:
∞

− rt
j
Min
∫ e ⋅ ∑ Ci (qi , ai , β i , I i )
j
Ii

…(4.1)

i

0

s.t. k&i j = I i j (t ) − δ i j k i j (t ) , j = q, a, β ,

Qs = f s ( As , E s (t ), H s (t ), ε s ) + γ s ≥ Qs ,

…(4.2)
…(4.3)

k i j (0) is given.
The current value Hamiltonian of this dynamic problem is



Hˆ = ∑ C i (qi (t ), ai (t ), β i (t ), I i j (t )) + ∑ µ i j (t ) ⋅ ( I i j (t ) − δ i j ⋅ k i j (t ))
i 
j


…(4.4)

The corresponding Lagrange Equation is

L = Hˆ + ∑ λ s (t ) ⋅ (Qs − f s ( As , E s (t ), H s (t ), ε s ) − γ s )

…(4.5)

s

The FOCs are

 ∂C ∗ (⋅)

I i j ⋅  i j + µ i j  = 0 , I i j ≥ 0
 ∂I i


…(4.6)

λ s ⋅ [Qs − f s∗ ( As , E s (t ), H s (t ), ε s ) − γ s ] = 0 , λs ≥ 0

…(4.7)
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rµ i j − µ& i j =

∂f s∗ (⋅)
∂C i∗ (⋅)
∂L∗
j
j
j
&
µ
δ
µ
λ
r
+
⋅
⇒
=
+
−
(
)
∑s s ∂k j
i
i
i
∂k i j
∂k i j
i

∂L∗
= 0 ⇒ k&i j = I i j∗ − δ i j k i j∗
j
∂µ i

…(4.8)

…(4.9)

and the transversality condition is

lim e − rt ⋅ µ i j (t ) ⋅ k i j (t ) = 0
t →∞

…(4.10)

From (4.6)

µi

j∗

∂C i∗ (⋅)
= −C i' ( I i j∗ )
=−
j
∂I i

∂I i j
1
=
= −C i'' ( I i j∗ ) −1 , ∀j .
j
j
j
∂µ i
∂µ i / ∂I i

…(4.11)

…(4.12)

Therefore,

µ& i j =

∂µ i j
∂C ' ( I j∗ )
∂C ' ( I j∗ ) ∂I j
= − i i = − i ji ⋅ i = −C i'' ( I i j∗ ) ⋅ I&i j
∂t
∂t
∂t
∂I i

…(4.13)

then substitute Eq. (4.13) into Eq. (4.8),

I&i j = −

∂f s∗ (⋅)
∂C i∗ (⋅)
1
j
j∗
[(
δ
)
µ
λ
r
+
⋅
⋅
+
−
∑s s ∂k j ]
i
i
C i'' ( I i j∗ )
∂k i j
i

…(4.14)

Eq. (4.14) and Eq. (4.9) could form a Hamiltonian dynamic system regarding the
dynamic control variable of investment I i j , and the state variable, capital stocks k i j .
The steady state is defined at the point ( I i j∗ , k i j∗ ) , when I&i j = k&i j = 0, ∀i, ∀j .
Then from Eq. (4.9) and (4.14),

I i j∗ = δ i j ⋅ k i j∗

1

µ i j∗

∂f s∗ (⋅)
∂C i∗ (⋅)
) − δij = r
− ∑ λs ⋅
⋅(
j
j
∂k i
∂k i
s

…(4.15)

…(4.16)

Eq. (4.15) and (4.16) have clear economic interpretations. Eq. (4.15) says that in the
long-run steady state, investment in all the three activities should equal the depreciation
rate of capital in these activities so that the capital stocks remain at a constant level. This
equation implies some economic interpretation. The right hand side of Eq. (4.16) is the
interest rate and discount factor or average rate of return in capital in the economy. The
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left hand side consists of two parts. The first part, similar as in the static analysis, is the
marginal effects of an extra unit of capital committed to output, abatement, or
abstraction on the firm’s individual costs, net of the marginal shadow value of capital
committed to environmental quality. The second part is the depreciation rate of the
capital stock. The right hand side is then the overall average rate of return of the capital
invested in the plant. Therefore, in the steady state equilibrium, investment should
increase up to the point where it yields the same rate of return as in other area of the
economy. Overall Eq.(4.16) states that under the optimal investment management, the
internal rate of return of the capital stock should equal the rate of return of capital
invested in elsewhere in economy.

4.2 The Stability Property of Equilibrium
The steady state may be found by setting the motion of costate, state and control
variables of the dynamic system to zero, which in our case are the variables of µ i j , k i j
and I i j . However, knowing the steady state equilibrium is not very meaningful without
knowing stability of the dynamic system. An equilibrium point that only exists in
principle, but cannot be reached, and which is such that the slightest disturbance leads to
divergence – an unstable equilibrium point – is obliviously not very relevant from an
economic point of view (Gandolfo 1997). The following analysis investigated the
stability properties of the dynamic system.

4.2.1 Dynamic system of k&i j , I&i j
I already have that

I&i j = −

∂f s∗ (⋅)
∂C i∗ (⋅)
1
j
j
]
+ ∑ λs ⋅
⋅ [(r + δ i ) µ i −
C i'' ( I i j∗ )
∂k i j
∂k i j
s

k&i j = I i j∗ − δ i j k i j∗ = F (k i j , I i j )

…(4.8)

…(4.9).

From Eq. (4.11), µ i j∗ = −C i' ( I i j∗ ) , so Eq. (4.14) becomes

I&i j = −

∂f s∗ (⋅)
∂C i∗ (⋅)
1
j
j∗
'
] = G (k i j , I i j ) …(4.17)
+ ∑ λs ⋅
⋅ [ −( r + δ i ) ⋅ C i ( I i ) −
j∗
j
j
''
Ci ( I i )
∂k i
∂k i
s

Due to the nonlinearity of the dynamic system defined by k&i j , I&i j , the global
stability of this system cannot be easily investigated. As this system is autonomous, the
following linearised system in the neighbourhood of its steady state is a good
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approximation to the original non-linear system formed by Eq. (4.8) and (4.17) around
the steady state equilibrium (Gandolfo 1997).

 ∂f i ( x ∗ ) 
When x is an equilibrium, x& (t ) = A( x(t ) − x ), A = 
, i, j = 1,2,...n . A
 ∂x j 
∗

∗

is the Jacobian matrix of the system evaluated at the equilibrium point. If the equilibrium
point in the linear approximation is globally stable, then it is locally stable at the original
non-linear system. The converse is not necessarily true (Xepapadeas 1997).
For the original non-linear system formed by Eq. (4.8) and (4.17),

 ∂F (⋅)
 ∂k j ,
A≡ i
 ∂G (⋅) ,
 ∂k i j

∂F (⋅) 
 a , a12 
∂I i j 

=  11
, in which
∂G (⋅)  j
a 21 , a 22 
j∗

k = ki
)
∂I i j  ( i j
I i = I i j∗

a11 = −δ i j < 0 ,

a12 = 1 ,

a 21 = −C i'' ( I i j∗ ) −1 ⋅ (∑ λ s ⋅
s

∂ 2 f s∗ (⋅)
∂k i j

2

−

∂ 2 C i∗ (⋅)
∂k i j

2

),

a 22 = r + δ i j > 0 1.

1

The value of element

a22 =

a 22 in the Jacobian matrix determined as below;

∂G (⋅)
= −Ci'' ( I i j∗ ) −2 ⋅ {[−(r + δ i j ) ⋅ Ci'' ( I i j∗ ) ⋅ Ci'' ( I i j∗ ) − Ci( 3) ( I i j∗ ) ⋅
∂I i j
[−(r + δ i j ) ⋅ Ci' ( I i j∗ ) −

∂Ci∗ (⋅)
∂f s∗ (⋅)
λ
+
⋅
∑s s ∂k j ]}
∂ki j
i

C i'' ( I i j ∗ ) and Ci(3) ( I i j∗ ) denote the second and third order differentiation against the investments
in each of the three sectors respectively. Since I&i

− (r + δ i j ) ⋅ Ci' ( I i j∗ ) −

a22 =

j

= 0 when I i j = I i j∗ , from Eq. (4.17)

∂Ci∗ (⋅)
∂f s∗ (⋅)
+
⋅
λ
= 0 . Therefore,
∑
s
∂ki j
∂ki j
s

∂G (⋅)
= −Ci'' ( I i j∗ )−2 ⋅ [−(r + δ i j ) ⋅ Ci'' ( I i j∗ ) ⋅ Ci'' ( I i j∗ )] = (r + δ i j ) .
j
∂I i
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If det A = a11 a 22 − a12 a 21 ≠ 0 , the qualitative behaviour of the trajectories of the
non-linear system in the neighbourhood of its steady state point (k i j ∗ , I i j ∗ ) is the same
as that of the linearized homogeneous system (Xepapadeas 1997). The sign of det A
then indicates the stability properties of the dynamic system.
The signs of the partial derivatives of costs and water quality with respect to k i j and

I i j determine the sign of det A . Since it is more expensive to accelerate the increase in
capital stock, C i' ( I i j ) > 0, C i'' ( I i j ) ≥ 0 . From the relationship stated in Eq. (4.9), it is

∂ 2 C i (⋅)
∂C i (⋅)
> 0,
≥ 0 2 . For the partial derivatives of
also reasonable to assume
2
j
j
∂k i
∂k i
water

quality

to

the

capital

stock

in

each

sector,

it

follows

that

∂f (⋅)
∂f (⋅)
∂f s (⋅)
< 0, s β < 0 and s a > 0 . Due to the increasing marginal damage of
q
∂k i
∂k i
∂k i
water pollution, I can assume that

∂f s2 (⋅)
∂k iq

2

≤ 0,

∂f s2 (⋅)
∂k iβ

2

≤ 0 . On the other hand, the effect

of abatement on pollution effluent is either constant or diminishing in most of the
situations, i.e.

∂f s2 (⋅)
∂k ia

2

≤ 0.

From the discussion and assumptions above, it is not difficult to see that

det A = a11 a 22 − a12 a 21 < 0 , ∀j . Therefore the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix
A are of opposite sign. The steady state point (k i j∗ , I i j∗ ) of the non-linear dynamic
system I&i j is a saddle point equilibrium for the capital stock and investment, and the
trajectories in the plane display a property of a saddle point, at least locally.

4.2.2 Qualitative analysis: phase diagram
Since many dynamic systems of non-linear differential equations cannot be solved
analytically, the qualitative properties of their solutions can sometimes be described and
examined by a graphic device, phase diagram (Léonard and Long 1992).

2

This may not always be true in reality. An exceptional case in reality could be found in Hanley
et al. (1998), in which the abatement of pollution in a particularly large firm has decreasing
2
marginal cost, i.e. ∂ C i (⋅) < 0 .
2
∂ k ia
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The intersection of the lines k&i j = 0 and I&i j = 0 is the saddle point steady state
equilibrium ( k i j ∗ , I i j ∗ ) in the coordinated system of (k i j , I i j ) which is illustrated by the
phase plane of the system 3 . Since

∂ 2 f s∗ (⋅)
∂k i

∂ 2 C i∗ (⋅)
∂k i

j2

j2

≤0 ,

∂ 2 C i∗ (⋅)
∂k i

j2

≥ 0 , C i'' ( I i j∗ ) ≥ 0 and

increases faster than C i'' ( I i j ∗ ) with k i j , when they are continuous, the function

of the slope for I&i j = 0 implies that lim
− (Gk / G I ) = 0 and j limj − (Gk / G I ) = −∞ ,
j
k i →0

3

k i → k i max

The slope of the isoclines are defined as

− ( Fk / FI ) and − (Gk / G I ) respectively:

∂I i j
j
&
= −( Fk / FI ) = δ i j > 0 ;
ki = 0 ⇒
j
∂k i

∑ λs ⋅

∂ 2 f s∗ (⋅)
2

−

∂ 2 C i∗ (⋅)
2

s
∂I j
∂k i j
∂k i j
I&i j = 0 ⇒ i j = −(Gk / G I ) = −
∂k i
− C i'' ( I i j∗ ) −1 ⋅ (r + δ i j )
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where k i j max is the maximum value k i j could take4. The sign of k&i j , I&i j in the regions

∂I&i j
separated by their isoclines are also determined.
= r + δ i j > 0 . Holding k i j
j
∂I i
constant, an increase in I i j will result in an increase in I&i j , I&i j is positive above I&i j = 0
and negative below it. Similarly,

∂k&i j
= −δ i j < 0 , so k&i j is negative to the right of
∂k i j

isocline k&i j = 0 and positive to the left. The phase diagram is illustrated as Figure 1.
Since we have shown that the Jacobian matrix A has a negative determinant, the
dynamic system above is unstable with saddle point equilibrium at (k i j ∗ , I i j ∗ ) . A unique
property of saddle point equilibrium is that there is only one trajectory in the plan would
converge to the steady state equilibrium while others only diverge away from it (Hoy et
al. 2001). The two lines, s and r, determined by the eigenvectors of the Jacobian matrix

A respectively, are the asymptotes to all the remaining trajectories (Gandolfo 1997),
while s is the stable arm of saddle point The analytical and numerical methods for
identify the stable arm of saddle-point equilibrium are discussed by Shone (2002) with
specified functions.

4.3 Implication of river policy
The section below discussed the policy implication of two types of economic
incentive instruments, the ETS scheme and TPP system. The environmental economists
have advertised these instruments over the last few decades (Oates and Strassmann 1984;
Baumol and Oates 1988; Perman et al. 1996; Hanley et al. 1997; Cowan 1998). But in
most of the research, the application of these instruments was restrained to static
analysis, only few of them discussed the possible implication under dynamic system
(Xepapadeas 1997). This paper did not discuss their implication in a static situation, but
the implementation in a dynamic regulating system to improve the water quality in a
river system. I also pointed out the differences between those under the static analysis.

4.3.1 ETS scheme
Under the ETS scheme, a firm in principle is required to pay (receive) an aggregate
emission and water abstraction tax (subsidy) at any site along the river, depends on
whether they discharge or abstract more than the baseline right they are initially allowed
4

Recalling the increasing marginal damage to the water quality from effluent discharge and water

abstraction, and the diminishing marginal effects of pollution
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by the environment authority. The tax (subsidy) for source at site i is

(

)

(

)

Tie + Tia = ∑ ei − ei0 ⋅ bis ⋅ t es + ∑ β i − β i0 ⋅ d is ⋅ t as , where t es and t as are the tax
s

s

rates for effluent discharge or water abstraction at site s that the firm affects. Thus the
objective of a cost-minimizing firm under the ETS is to
∞

− rt
q
a
j
0
0
β
Min
∫ e ⋅ [Ci (qi (k i ), ai (k i ), β i (k i ), I i ) + ∑ t es bis (ei − ei ) +∑ t as d is ( β i − β i )]
j
Ii

s

0

s

s.t. Eq. (4.2), e(t ) ≥ 0, β (t ) ≥ 0 and k i j (0) is given.

The current value Hamiltonian for the problem is

Hˆ = C i (qi , ai , β i , I i j ) + ∑ t es bis (ei − ei0 ) + ∑ t as d is ( β i − β i0 ) + ∑ µ i j ⋅ ( I i j − δ i j ⋅ k i j )
s

s

j

The following FOCs are then implied:

 ∂C ∗ (⋅)

I i j ⋅  i j + µ i j  = 0 , I i j ≥ 0
 ∂I i


µ& i j = (r + δ i j ) µ i j −


∂C i∗ (⋅)
∂ei∗
∂β i∗ 

− ∑  t es ⋅ bis ⋅ j + t as ⋅ d is ⋅ j  ,
∂k i j
∂k i
∂k i 
s 

k&i j = I i j∗ − δ i j k i j∗ ,

…(4.6)

…(4.18)
…(4.9)

along with the transversality condition (4.10).
The variation of the investment in each sector of capital stock is derived from:



∂C ∗ (⋅)
∂e ∗
∂β ∗ 
I&i j = −C i'' ( I i j ) −1 ⋅ (r + δ i j ) µ i j − i j − ∑  t es ⋅ bis ⋅ ij + t as ⋅ d is ⋅ ij  …(4.19)
∂k i
∂k i
∂k i 
s 

Comparing the FOCs under the ETS and relative to (4.6) to (4.10), when the
following tax rates are set for discharge effluent and water abstraction:

∂f s∗ (⋅)
∂f s∗ (⋅)
and t as = −λ s ⋅
, the equilibria achieved through cost
t es = −λ s ⋅
∂E s
∂H s
minimization management would be the same as the pollution control optimum of
minimized cost through direct control.
When these tax rates are applied, not only the two different policy instruments would
lead to the same equilibrium, it also insures that the dynamic of the systems under the
two policy instruments have the same properties of stability. That is, the dynamic system
under ETS has saddle point equilibrium with only one trajectory converging to the
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steady state equilibrium. Due to the difficulty of evaluating the appropriate value of
shadow price λs , tax rates might not always lead to the optimum, thus the ETS might not
be cost efficient. However, recalling the Jacobian matrix A , it can be proved that the
stability properties of the dynamic system under a ETS will remain the same as long as

∂f s∗ (⋅)
∂f s∗ (⋅)
the tax rates are of the opposite signs of
and
.
∂E s
∂H s
4.3.2 TPP system
In a TPP system a firm receives an initial quantity of effluent discharge permits or
water abstraction licenses or both, either through auction or “grandfathering”
distribution from the environment authority, denoted as eis0 and β is0 for the site s from
the firm at site i . The firm will demand more permits if its pollution emission and water
abstraction effects exceed the permits they hold for any site, if it is more costly to
increase abatement capacity or reduce production or vice versa.
Although TPP and tax schemes are usually regarded as having equivalent effects,
there are still some differences between them. One is that the optimal value of the tax
rates requires has to be chosen by the environment authority while in the TPP system the
price is achieved by market automatically. Another important difference is that pollution
permits are rights to pollute. Once they are purchased, pollution is allowed. So purchase
of pollution permits is more like a lump-sum payment compared with the annual
payment as tax or subsidy. Although the recent pollution permits are less likely to be
valid forever, permits are often renewable at a negligible price compared with the
purchase payment. Since initial permits could be allocated either through
“grandfathering” or auction, the model only considers pollution control costs after initial
distribution of permits.
The objective of cost minimization for the firm at site i (assuming its effluent
discharge and water abstraction are carried out locally) can be indicated as below:
∞

− rt
q
a
j
β
Min
∫ e ⋅ [Ci (qi (k i ), ai (k i ), β i (k i ), I i ) + ∑ e&is ⋅ Pes + ∑ β&is ⋅ Pas
j

Ii

0

s

…(4.20)

s

s.t. (4.2), e(t ) ≥ 0, β (t ) ≥ 0 and k i j (0) is given.
Since

e&is =

∂e
∂eis
∂ei
∂ei ∂k i j
= bis ⋅ ij ⋅ k&i j , j = q, a ,
= bis ⋅
= bis ⋅ j ⋅
∂t
∂t
∂k i
∂k i ∂t
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∂β
and similarly β&is = d is ⋅ ij ⋅ k&i j , the (4.20) can be rewritten as:
∂k i



∂e
∂β
Min ∫ e − rt ⋅  C i (qi , ai , β i , I i j ) + ∑ bis ⋅ ij ⋅ k&i j ⋅ Pes + ∑ d is ⋅ ij ⋅ k&i j ⋅ Pas  …(4.21)
∂k i
∂k i
s
s


0
∞

The current value Hamiltonian is

∂e
Hˆ = C i (qi , ai , β i , I i j ) + ∑ Pes ⋅ bis ⋅ ij ⋅ ( I i j − δ i j ⋅ k i j )
∂k i
s
∂β
+ ∑ Pas ⋅ d is ⋅ ij ⋅ ( I i j − δ i j ⋅ k i j ) + ∑ µ i j ⋅ ( I i j − δ i j ⋅ k i j )
∂k i
s
j

…(4.22)

The FOCs imply the following equations,

 ∂C i∗ (⋅)

∂ei∗
∂β i∗
∂Hˆ
j

0
b
P
d
µ
=
⇒
=
−
+
⋅
⋅
+
⋅
⋅ Pas  , ∀j
∑
∑
i
is
es
is
j
j
j
j

∂I i
∂k i
∂k i
s
s
 ∂I i

∗
∂ 2 ei∗ & j
∂C i∗ (⋅)
j ∂ei
− ∑ ( Pes ⋅ bis ⋅
⋅ k i −Pes ⋅ bis ⋅ δ i ⋅ j )
µ& i = (r + δ i ) µ i −
2
∂k i
∂k i j
s
∂k i j

j

j

…(4.23)

j

∗
∂ 2 β i∗ & j
j ∂β i
− ∑ ( Pas ⋅ d is ⋅
⋅ k i −Pas ⋅ d is ⋅ δ i ⋅ j ), ∀j
2
∂k i
s
∂k i j

k&i j = I i j∗ − δ i j k i j∗ , ∀j

…(4.24)

…(4.9)

along with the transversality condition (4.10).
In order to examine the steady state and compare it with to the ETS, we differentiate
(4.23) with respect to time to obtain:

µ& i j =

∂C i' ( I i j∗ ) ∂I i j
∂µ i j ∂µ i j ∂I i j
⋅
= −∂C i'' ( I i j∗ ) ⋅ I&i j
⋅
=−
=
j
j
∂t
∂t
∂t
∂I i
∂I i

…(4.25)

Substituting µ i j and µ& i j in Eq. (4.23) and (4.25) into Eq. (4.24) to give:
∗
∗
2 ∗
&I j = −C '' ( I j∗ ) −1 ⋅ [−(r + δ j ) ⋅ ∂Ci (⋅) − ∂Ci (⋅) − ∑ P ⋅ b ⋅ ∂ ei ⋅ k& j
i
i
i
es
is
i
2
∂k i j
∂I i j
s
∂k i j

∂β i∗
∂ 2 β i∗ & j
∂ei∗
r
P
d
k
r
P
b
−
⋅
⋅
⋅
− ∑ Pas ⋅ d is ⋅
⋅
−
⋅
⋅
⋅
∑s es is ∂k j ∑s as is ∂k j
i
2
s
∂k i j
i
i

…(4.26)

In the steady state where k&i j = I&i j = µ& i j = 0 , (4.26) is equivalent to (4.19) when

Pes = t es / r and Pas = t as / r , which is derived under the ETS. Therefore the ETS and
TPP system lead to the same steady state equilibrium for investment and capital stock in
each sector. This result implies that purchase of one pollution permit the firm saves the
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firm an infinite stream of tax payment for this unit of pollution. Therefore it needs to pay
an amount equal to the present value of the aggregate tax payment. The convergence and
stability properties of the steady state equilibrium in the TPP system are the same as that
in the ETS.

4.4 Comparative Statics
4.4.1 Short-run5 comparative statics
Assuming the effluent discharge is a function of the output and abatement,

ei = Z i (qi , α i ) , the short-run maximum principle of static analysis in the ETS can be
obtained as

∂Hˆ ∂C i∗ (⋅)
=
+ ∑ t es ⋅ bis = 0
∂ei
∂ei
s

…(4.27)

∂Hˆ ∂C i∗ (⋅)
=
+ ∑ t as ⋅ d is = 0
∂β i
∂β i
s

…(4.28)

Due to the implicit function theorem (Gandolfo 1997; Xepapadeas 1997; Hoy et al.
2001), the short-run comparative statics based on the (4.27) and (4.28) gives the effects
of the changes in effluent tax rate on the effluent discharge and water abstraction:

 C ee , C eβ   ∂ei ∂t es  − bis 
C , C  ⋅ 
= 0 
ββ  ∂β i ∂t es 


 eβ

…(4.29)

where C ee represents the second order partial derivative of cost function with respect to
effluent discharge. The abatement costs are assumed to have increasing marginal costs,
i.e. C ee , C eβ , C ββ ≥ 0 .
When D = C ee ⋅ C ββ − C e2β > 0 , applying the Cramer’s rule, it can be shown that

− bis , C eβ 
 0
C ββ 
∂β i
∂ei

=
=
≤ 0 and
∂t es
∂t es
D

 C ee
C
 eβ

− bis ,
0 
D

≥ 0.

 C ee , C eβ   ∂ei ∂t as   0 
⋅
=

C eβ , C ββ  ∂β i ∂t as  − d is 

Similarly, there is 

− bis , C eβ 
 0
C ββ 
∂β i
∂ei

=
=
≤ 0 and
so
∂t as
∂t as
D

 C ee
C
 eβ

− bis ,
0 
D

…(4.30),

≥ 0.

5

Short-run here refer to the period during which the plant is unable to vary its capacity of effluent
and
abstraction through capital investment, but abatement can vary within the current capacity.
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Therefore, it can be shown analytically that when the tax rate on one pollution type
(either effluent discharge or water abstraction) increases, the corresponding activity will
be restrained due to the more potent policy while other activities will become relatively
“cheaper” to apply.

4.4.2 Steady state comparative statics
At the steady state, I&i j = k&i j = 0 , implying that



∂C ∗ (⋅)
∂e ∗
∂β ∗ 
− C i'' ( I i j∗ ) −1 ⋅ (r + δ i j ) µ i j − i j − ∑  t es ⋅ bis ⋅ i j + t as ⋅ d is ⋅ ij  = 0 …(4.31)
∂k i
∂k i
∂k i 
s 

G (k i j∗ , I i j∗ ) = I i j∗ − δ i j k i j∗ = 0

…(4.32).

Because C i'' ( I i j ∗ ) −1 ≠ 0 and (4.11), this can be reduced to

F ( k i j ∗ , I i j ∗ ) = −( r + δ i j ) ⋅


∂C i∗ (⋅) ∂C i∗ (⋅)
∂ei∗
∂β i∗ 

t
b
t
d
−
−
⋅
⋅
+
⋅
⋅
∑s  es is ∂k j as is ∂k j  = 0
∂I i j
∂k i j
i
i 


…(4.33),
when

∂β i∗ ∂β i∗
∂ei∗
= 0.
=
=
0
and
∂k iq ∂k ia
∂k iβ

Applying the implicit function theorem to (4.33) and (4.32) gives


 Fk , FI  ∂k i j ∂t es  bis
=
G , G  ⋅  j
I   ∂I i ∂t es 
 k


When D =

∂ei∗ 
⋅ j
∂k i 
0 

…(4.34).

Fk , FI
∂k j
≠ 0 , it obtains that i =
Gk , G I
∂t es

Since D = Fk ⋅ G I − FI ⋅ Gk < 0 6 ,

∂ei∗
∂ei∗
j
δ
⋅
⋅
b
i
is
∂I j
∂k i j
∂k i j
.
and i =
∂t es
D
D

bis ⋅

∂k i j
∂I i j
and
will always have opposite sign of
∂t es
∂t es

j
∂k i j
∂ei∗
∂I i j
j ∂k i
δ
.
Similarly,
we
have
that
,
and
=
⋅
=
i
∂t es
∂t es
∂t as
∂k i j

∂I i j
=
∂t as

δ i j ⋅ d is ⋅
D

∂β i∗
∂k i j

∂β i∗
∂k i j
D

d is ⋅

.

∂ 2 C i (⋅)
It can be proved that Fk ≤ 0, FI ≤ 0, G k = −δ i < 0, G I = 1 since
≥0
j∗
j∗
k
I
∂
⋅
∂
i
i
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2007
6

and

j

25

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 84 [2007]

Cost effectiveness in River Management: Evaluation of Integrated River Policy System in Tidal Ouse

Tao Wang

The comparative statics in the steady state indicate different effects compared with
the short run effects. An increase in tax rates on one particular pollution activity reduces
the activity, as it does in the short run. But in the steady state the capital stock and
investment level in other activities are independent of the change. This is due to the
independence of investment sectors.
The results of comparative statics on the TPP system are very similar to those for a
ETS (Xepapadeas 1997). Therefore the comparative statics under both instruments are
summarized in Table 1 and 2.
Table 1: Short-run comparative statics

ei

βi

t es

-

+

t as

+

-

Pes

-

+

Pas

+

-

Table 2: Steady State Comparative Statics

k iq

k ia

k iβ

I iq

I ia

I iβ

t es

-

+

0

-

+

0

t as

0

0

-

0

0

-

Pes

-

+

0

-

+

0

Pas

0

0

-

0

0

-

5. Empirical example of water quality management in tidal

Ouse
This empirical example described the methods and result of static optimisation when
the variation of assimilative capacity was taken into account by including various
options to improve the water quality in tidal Ouse. In this optimisation, the variation of
assimilative capacity was assorted with the effects of changing the location of effluent
discharge. For the first time, the option of reducing water abstraction to improvement
assimilative capacity and water quality was also integrated with the standard option of
reducing effluent discharge. Therefore, reducing effluent discharge, changing discharge
location and reducing water abstraction were integrated evaluated against their effects on
improving water quality and corresponding cost incurred, to achieve the least cost of
obtaining the required water quality in the tidal Ouse.
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QUESTS1D model, which is a hydrological model used by the EA to set the effluent
consents in the tidal Ouse was utilized in this research to predict the resulted water
quality at different WQM sites under various conditions. The simulation results of
QUESTS1D model were used to generate a system of water quality functions that can
predict the water qualities just based on a few most influencing factors. QUEST1D
divided the tidal Ouse into 282 cells, around 1 km each. The system of water quality
functions consisted of five functions for five different cells in the QUESTS1D model
around three WQM sites, which are likely experience severe DO sag issue during low
flow summer. In this research, they were the water qualities of cell 180 at Selby, cell 192
and 193 at Long Drax, and cell 197 and 199 at Boothferry Bridge, in terms of 5%ile
DO%. The most influencing factors to the water qualities of these cells include the
effluent discharge levels from both industries and Sewage Treatment Plants (STWs),
water abstraction from river Ouse and Derwent, and the effluent discharge location. The
associated cots of these options were estimated based on the data provided by the
industries and EA. The summation of annual costs was to be minimised against given
water quality target in the tidal Ouse.
The static optimisation was calculated through the General Algebraic Modelling
System (GAMS) to provide the optimal solution for the cost minimisation. It was proved
that relocating the effluent discharges was most effective measure to improve the water
quality. With effluents from Selby area being discharged at downstream of the river
Ouse, the water quality along the river Ouse could be significantly improved even in the
low flow conditions as 1996, but at less cost than it incur currently.

5.1 Constraints: the System of Water Quality Functions
The simplified system of water quality function for the following points in 1996 is
shown as below Table 3. The first column is the number of cells predicted through the
simplified system. The numbers of the cells to be predicted through the system of water
quality functions are chosen at 180, 192, 193, 197 and 199. Cell 180 is around WQM
site at Selby, while cell 192 and 193 locate at Long Drax and cell 197 and 199 at
Boothferry Bridge. The WQM sites of Naburn Weir and Cawood are not regarded to be
at risk as their DO% are more than 60% even in the worst situation in 1996, therefore
the water quality functions did not take into account these two sites. The same reason
applies to Blacktoft, where the water quality is basically dominated by the flow of Trent
and is consistent over various management options in river Ouse. The water qualities at
the five points are predicted simultaneously through this system of functions as 5%ile
DO% of the cell.
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Table 3: Coefficients table of the system of water quality functions
Cell constant

180

-442.09

X

X

2

ln(SBOD)

ln(Ouse) ln(Derw) ln(Sna) ln(Sand) ln(Tho)

1.474 -0.042

-3.604

128.210

9.220

None

None

None

192 -113.406 -0.028 -0.020

-9.238

37.174

23.418

None

None

None

193

-79.943 -0.424 -0.011

-9.432

28.993

23.206

None

None

None

197

37.749

-1.552 0.019

-9.032

1.060

17.697

0.141

-0.228

0.085

199

42.566

-1.518 0.020

-8.922

-0.763

16.800

0.160

-0.261

0.098

The sequent nine variables are the estimators of water quality function: the first one
is constant; the X in the second and third column is the distance from discharge
location to the Trent Fall in kilometre. SBOD is the total tonnes of BOD5 discharged
from the sources around Selby per day, from three industries in Selby and the Barlby and
Selby STWs. Ouse and Derwent are river flows (m3/s) of rivers Ouse and Derwent
while the flows of other tributaries remains unchanged. Sna, Sand and Tho are another
three different STWs in the tributaries Aire and Don, having no effects on the first three
points. The location of effluent discharges is best fit to the water quality as a quadratic
function, as the improvement is quite slow when X is large (very upstream) or small
(very downstream), but faster in the mid-range of tidal Ouse. The effect of BOD5
discharge on water quality is best described as logarithmic function, so is the effect of
river flow. This is understandable as both of the factors have diminishing marginal effect
on the water quality. See Appendix 1 for the details of the regression analysis.

5.2 Objectives: Cost Functions of Pollution Abatement
The objective cost function is the aggregated costs of various options, including the
cost of effluent abatement within individual industry and STW, the cost of reducing
water abstraction from rivers Ouse and Derwent and the cost of moving the effluent
discharges along the river Ouse. The optimal solution is the combination of the three
options when their aggregated cost is least and the water quality target is satisfied. All
the cost functions were estimated by the cost data provide by the industries and STWs
themselves over several years. They were derived from the regression results of statistic
package of SPSS and generated highly agreement against the observations. The exact
functions were not provided here for confidential reasons.

5.3 Static Optimisation Analysis
Having estimated the cost functions of effluent treatment, abstraction reduction,
discharge relocation, and the system of water quality functions, an arbitrary water
quality target at the water WQM sites to be achieved through the river management
options is expected to be obtained at the least costs through the static optimisation. The
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static optimisation takes the form as below, where Qs and Qs are the water quality
prediction and target at cell s in terms of DO%:

Minimize C total = Cost ind + Cost STW + Cost abs + Cost mov

s.t. Qs = f s ( X , SBOD, Ouse, Derw, Sna, Sand , Tho) ≥ Qs
The cells s predicted in this research are cells 180, 192, 193, 197 and 199, reflecting
the water qualities at Selby, Long Drax and Boothferry Bridge that are at risk of DO sag
during the summer. The arbitrary water quality target for these cells can be various, but
is assumed as 30% DO% at 5%ile in order to protect the return of salmon. All the three
options have effects on water quality improvements at different prices. Analysing the
effects on water quality and economic cost of the trade-off among these options, the
static optimisation is able to find the best combination levels of them, to satisfy the
quality target at least cost. When no constraints applied, the optimal solution would be at
the point where each option has the same marginal cost over water quality improvement.
This research used General Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS) to find the optimal
solution. GAMS has been widely applied for issues involving computable general
equilibrium models, particularly become popular in the area of environmental economics
to model the cost of environmental policy (Dellink 2005). In this research, GMAS was
used to optimise the cost minimization problem facing a given water quality target,
through a range of non-linear programming solvers (Brooke et al. 1998; McCarl 2004).

5.4 Static Optimisation Results
Due to the European Directive of Urban Waste Water Treatment (UWWTD), it is
unlikely in reality to change the abatement levels in the STWs. By far, two of the
industries have been using their effluent treatment plants for a quite long period and
would have to install new plant if the effluent discharge consents become more stringent.
Therefore an optimal solution with slacker abatement requirement would be welcomed
by the industries facing international competitions, as well as the local economy of
Selby. In this research, all the five STWs (Barlby, Selby, Sna, San and Tho) were
assumed to be working at the current levels in 2004 to comply with the UWWTD
requirement, while the abatement levels in industries, water abstraction levels and
effluent discharge location were all subject to optimisation.
The optimal solution calculated using GAMS was given as below. The abatement in
the STWs was fixed at current levels of 2004. The resulted water total abstraction
remains unchanged although more water abstraction was advised to be from river
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2007
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Derwent. The optimal abatement levels of the three industries in Selby, water abstraction
levels and effluent discharge location were given in Table 4.
Table 4: Static Optimal Solutions
Industry
A

Industry
B

Industry
C

STW
A

STW
B

Ouse

Derwent

X

STW
C

STW
D

STW
E

1.081

1.081

1.081

0.599

1.955

0.637

3.530

14.890

0.498

7.902

2.954

Table 5: Resulted water qualities at WQM sites

Site

Selby

Long Drax

Boothferry Bridge

Cell

Q180

Q192

Q193

Cell

Q180

DO%

30.000

34.231

33.968

DO%

30.000

Table 6: Cost of river management

Cost (m£)

Abatement

Abstraction

Relocation

Total

4.074

5.541

0.746

10.361

In this optimal solution for the least cost of river management, there was no need for
the industries in Selby to abate their effluents since the STWs had reduced the pollution
more than enough. Reducing water abstraction levels was still too costly as a means of
improving water quality than the others. However, since the cost of water abstraction
were same, the shifting of water abstraction from Ouse to Derwent suggested that the
marginal effect of water abstraction on the water quality was higher in river Ouse than in
river Derwent. Therefore it was better to just abstract from river Derwent if possible.
The optimal discharge location was 14.890 km upstream from the Trent Fall, downstream
of the confluence of river Don. The dilution effects from tributaries Aire and Don
seemed quite promising according to the choice.
Table 5 showed the resulted water qualities at the five points concerned. The two
binding points were, Q180 and Q199. The water qualities of the other three points were
significantly higher than the requirement. Water quality along the river Ouse was largely
improved between Selby and Boothferry compared the current situation, and the DO sag
disappeared in the river Ouse even in the year as bad as 1996. The QUESTS1D
simulation using the optimal solution confirmed the prediction from the water quality
functions. Figure 2 indicated the 5%ile DO% along the river Ouse under the optimal
solution generated using GAMS.
From the simulation results of QUESTS1D, it can be seen that the predictions from
the water quality functions system were generally more pessimistic than the simulation
results. This means the optimal solution obtained from GAMS optimisation would result
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in slightly better water quality in reality, which reduces the risk of failure in compliance
due to inevitable model errors and uncertainties. The DO% of river Ouse following the
optimal solution, as indicated in the simulation, decreased first due to the tidal inflow
and the resuspended sediments, then slowly increased after Selby and reach the best
around Drax, then decrease again, but finally became stable around 35% and recovered
after the confluence with river Trent.
5 % ile D is s o lv e d O x y g e n
9 0 .0 0

N a b u rn
8 0 .0 0

Caw ood
7 0 .0 0

S e lb y

D ra x
6 0 .0 0

B o o th fe rry

B la c k t o f t

DO (%)

5 0 .0 0

4 0 .0 0

3 0 .0 0

2 0 .0 0

1 0 .0 0

0 .0 0
150

200

250

300

C e ll

0400 O use

U C O use

Figure 2: DO% under optimal solution

The optimal solution estimated an aggregate cost of at least £10.361m for the river
management to comply with the 30% DO% requirement. However, since the water
abstraction was not reduced, the abstraction cost is just to satisfy the water demand
rather than improving the water quality. This should not be regarded as the costs
incurred by water quality improvement. The rest costs of the effluent abatement and
relocating the discharge site account for £4.820m in together, achieving much better
water quality along the river Ouse at slightly less cost than that is currently endured by
the industries and STWs. More than 60% of the costs of effluent abatement and
relocation were contributed from the STWs since their abatement levels remained
unchanged. The relocation of effluent discharge only accounted for 15% of the costs but
had obviously much significant impact on the river water quality.
As a virtue of the simplified system of water quality functions, the optimisation
could be easily revised against different water quality targets. This makes it very
convenient to investigate the difference among solutions to various policy scenarios.
Therefore this optimisation system could work for not only the 30% DO% at the
selected cells, but also applicable to other water quality targets that are required by the
environmental
authority.
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There are also some potential constraints to the optimal solution. The first one lies
into the construction needed to transfer the effluents to new discharge location. Although
the annual cost of transfer is just a small proportion of the aggregate annual cost, the
capital investment required to build the storage facility and lay down the pipes are
almost £10m. This enormous cost could be a possible obstacle to the acceptance of the
solution, especially considering that the STWs would not benefit from the solution since
they have to maintain the levels of abatement. If the industries were asked to bear capital
cost alone, the investment cost would be too high to be accepted by the slim-profited
manufacture industries. The second is due to same fact mentioned above. Since the
STWs have to maintain their abatement levels because of UWWTD, they would be
reluctant to pay for the effluent relocation that make no change to their responsibility of
abatement. Reallocation of the benefits among the industries and STWs through
negotiation could probably reach a solution for the two constraints in order to ensure the
STWs’ participation, since the resulted slackness in the industries on effluent discharges
were partly attributed by the abatements in the STWs. Appropriate payment to the STWs
would motivate their participations while still leave the industries better off, given the
payment is not greater than the industries’ benefit obtained from the relocation of
effluent discharge. This could be achieved through either emission ETS or TPP system.
But this is beyond the discussion of this paper. Finally, it is needed to point out that
although the STWs could not reduce their abatement levels through the optimal solution,
they still benefit from the increased potential of scaling up as the DO sag issue is
removed from Selby area by the optimal solution. This is consistent to the increasing
demand of sewage services initiated by the increase of population and economy in the
North Yorkshire and Lincolnshire (Jarvie et al. 1997) and can reduce the risks of failure
in providing sewage service during the extreme conditions such as flood.

6. Conclusion
The river water quality control in the estuarine system such as Ouse/Humber system
is not at all a simple issue. The resuspended sediment due to the tidal movement
deteriorates the impacts on the river water quality of effluent discharges from both
industry and STWs. This is also accompanied by the impacts of water reduction when
significant water volume is taken for supplying water within the whole catchment.
Because of the various drivers for the water quality issue in the tidal Ouse, it is not
reasonable to regulate on just one of them to improve the water quality. This paper tried
to explore an integrated river policy to improve the water quality in the tidal Ouse and
remove the DO sag during the summer in order to resume the salmon return. The
integrated river policy included the options of improving water quality through reducing
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effluent discharges from industries and STWs, reducing the water abstraction from
various sites and relocating the position of effluent discharges. Optimal solution was
provided by solving the constrained optimisation problem of minimizing the cost of
river quality management for particular water quality target.
This paper discussed the necessary conditions for the cost minimisation problem
with specific water quality requirement, both under static and dynamic system. In the
optimisation issue, the spatial location of effluent discharge and water abstraction were
taken into account based on their effects on the water qualities at the EA’s WQM site.
Reduction in both effluent discharge and water abstraction were also included, and
evaluated based on their costs and impacts on water quality improvement. This paper
also discussed the mechanism of allocating the pollution abatement and water
abstraction among the sources through the policy instruments of ETS scheme and TPP
system. The choice of policy instruments in pollution control has been discussed for
some time. Most economists agreed that, although there are still limitations in
implementation, MBIs have several key advantages over the direct controls, particularly
in the cost savings and the continuous motivation to pollution control. This paper
showed how the ETS scheme and TPP system could be implemented for water quality
management, when the location of emissions and abstraction were taken into account.
Some conclusions of the research are as followed:
1. Because of the different location effects of pollution, the equilibrium of least cost
solution will take into account both effluents and water abstractions, following the
variation of assimilative capacity of the river water.
2. In the static analysis, the least cost equilibrium requires that the ratio between the
marginal costs of water abstraction and its effects on the water quality be equal to the
marginal costs of effluent discharge and its effects on the water quality, which is the
shadow cost of river water quality at the equilibrium.
3. When the dynamic optimisation is considered, in addition to the conditions
required in the static analysis, the least cost solution requires that the internal rate of
return on investment should equal the rate of return on investment elsewhere in the
economy.
4. The steady state equilibrium is a saddle point, therefore the combination of capital
stocks and investment decisions has to follow a particular trajectory through which the
least cost solutions at each period of time will eventually lead to stable equilibrium of
the dynamic system. Since initial capital stocks are determined by exogenous investment
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choice, there is necessity for the plant to find this temporal investment path in order to
achieve the stable equilibrium of the dynamic system.
5. The empirical example of the water quality improvement in the tidal Ouse
consists of a system of water quality function derived from QUESTS1D model, and the
cost functions of water quality improvement. Solving the constrained optimisation
problem using GAMS revealed that the, through specific combination of effluent
discharge and water abstraction, and location of discharge, the water quality of tidal
Ouse could be significantly improved even under the worst flow condition over the last
ten years, with less costs than that borne by the industries and STWs. The required water
quality target of 30% DO% at 5%ile what was proved infeasible through the reduction of
effluent discharges alone under the flow condition of 1996, can only be achieved
through the combining options taking into account effluent relocation and water
abstraction reduction.
A relatively novel feature of this research is the integrated management of effluent
discharge and water abstraction within the same river policy. The variation of effluent
discharge location was considered to reflect the spatial difference between the pollution
sources. The integration of this regarding to river policy determination could include the
integration of both effluent discharge and water abstraction, integration of timing and
spatial effects, and the integration of both physical effect on water quality and economic
costs to the society. This research has evaluated these integrations although the variation
of timing of effluent discharges was not discussed in this paper due to its
impracticability. This integration enables the policy maker to offer sufficient flexibility
in the pollution control options available in order to achieve cost effectiveness in the
water quality management for the estuarine system, which is consistent to the
requirement of WFD. But there are more options and policy instruments that are not
considered in this research, and many of them may well be effective even they were not
recommended in this research for tidal Ouse. The determination of integrated river
policy aiming at achieving the water quality target at the least cost depends on the
particular river system and catchment concerned, in order to avoid the disproportionate
cost coming from ineffective regulations.
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